Toward a neural basis of interactive alignment in conversation by Laura Menenti et al.
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 27 June 2012
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00185
Toward a neural basis of interactive alignment
in conversation
Laura Menenti1,2*, Martin J. Pickering3 and Simon C. Garrod1
1 Institute for Neuroscience and Psychology, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
2 Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, Netherlands
3 Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Edited by:
Chris Frith, Wellcome Trust Centre
for Neuroimaging at University
College London, UK
Reviewed by:
István Winkler, University of Szeged,
Hungary
Kristian Tylen, Aarhus University,
Denmark
*Correspondence:
Laura Menenti, Max Planck Institute
for Psycholinguistics, P. O. Box 310,
6500 AH Nijmegen, Netherlands.
e-mail: laura.menenti@mpi.nl
The interactive-alignment account of dialogue proposes that interlocutors achieve
conversational success by aligning their understanding of the situation under discussion.
Such alignment occurs because they prime each other at different levels of representation
(e.g., phonology, syntax, semantics), and this is possible because these representations
are shared across production and comprehension. In this paper, we briefly review
the behavioral evidence, and then consider how findings from cognitive neuroscience
might lend support to this account, on the assumption that alignment of neural
activity corresponds to alignment of mental states. We first review work supporting
representational parity between production and comprehension, and suggest that neural
activity associated with phonological, lexical, and syntactic aspects of production and
comprehension are closely related. We next consider evidence for the neural bases of the
activation and use of situation models during production and comprehension, and how
these demonstrate the activation of non-linguistic conceptual representations associated
with language use. We then review evidence for alignment of neural mechanisms that
are specific to the act of communication. Finally, we suggest some avenues of further
research that need to be explored to test crucial predictions of the interactive alignment
account.
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INTRODUCTION
Conversation involves an extremely complicated set of processes
in which participants have to interweave their activities with pre-
cise timing, and yet it is a skill that all speakers seem very good
at (Garrod and Pickering, 2004). One argument for why conver-
sation is so easy is that interlocutors tend to become aligned at
different levels of linguistic representation and therefore find it
easier to perform this joint activity than the individual activities
of speaking or listening (Garrod and Pickering, 2009). Pickering
and Garrod (2004) explain the process of alignment in terms of
their interactive-alignment account. According to this account,
conversation is successful to the extent that participants come to
understand the relevant aspects of what they are talking about in
the same way. More specifically, they construct mental models of
the situation under discussion (i.e., situation models; Zwaan and
Radvansky, 1998), and successful conversation occurs when these
models become aligned. Interlocutors usually do not align delib-
erately. Rather, alignment is largely the result of the tendency for
interlocutors to repeat each other’s linguistic choices at many dif-
ferent levels, such as words and grammar (Garrod and Anderson,
1987; Brennan and Clark, 1996; Branigan et al., 2000). Such align-
ment is, therefore, a form of imitation. Essentially, interlocutors
prime each other to speak about things in the same way, and peo-
ple who speak about things in the same way tend to think about
them in the same way as well.
At the level of situation models, interlocutors align on spatial
reference frames: if one speaker refers to objects egocentrically
(e.g., “on the left” to mean on the speaker’s left), then the other
speaker tends to use an egocentric perspective as well (Watson
et al., 2004). More generally, they align on a characterization of
the representational domain, for instance using coordinate sys-
tems (e.g., A4, D3) or figural descriptions (e.g., T-shape, right
indicator) to refer to positions in a maze (Garrod and Anderson,
1987; Garrod and Doherty, 1994). They also repeat each other’s
referring expressions, even when they are unnecessarily specific
(Brennan and Clark, 1996). Imitation also occurs for grammar,
with speakers repeating the syntactic structure used by their inter-
locutors for cards describing events (Branigan et al., 2000; e.g.,
“the diver giving the cake to the cricketer”) or objects (Cleland
and Pickering, 2003; e.g., “the sheep that is red”), and repeating
syntax or closed-class lexical items in question-answering (Levelt
and Kelter, 1982). Bilinguals even repeat syntax between lan-
guages, for example when one interlocutor speaks English and the
other speaks Spanish (Hartsuiker et al., 2004). Finally, there is evi-
dence for alignment of phonetics (Pardo, 2006), and of accent and
speech rate (Giles et al., 1991).
An important property of interactive alignment is that it is
automatic in the sense that speakers are not aware of the process
and that it does not appear effortful. Such automatic imita-
tion or mimicry occurs in social situations more generally. Thus,
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Dijksterhuis and Bargh (2001) argued that many social behaviors
are automatically triggered by perception of the actions of other
people, in a way that often leads to imitation (e.g., Chartrand and
Bargh, 1999). We propose that the automatic alignment chan-
nels linking different levels of linguistic representation operate in
essentially the same fashion (see Figure 1). In other words, con-
versationalists do not need to decide to interpret each different
level of linguistic representation for alignment to occur at all these
channels (Pickering and Garrod, 2006). This is because the align-
ment channels reflect priming rather than deliberative processing.
In addition there are aspects of automatic non-linguistic imita-
tion that can facilitate alignment at linguistic levels (Garrod and
Pickering, 2009). For example, when speakers and listeners align
their gaze to look at the same thing this can facilitate alignment
of interpretation (Richardson and Dale, 2005; Richardson et al.,
2007). The reverse also appears to hold, with linguistic align-
ment enhancing romantic attraction, which presumably involves
non-linguistic alignment (Ireland et al., 2011).
The interactive alignment account makes two basic assump-
tions about language processing in dialogue. First, there is parity
of representations used in speaking and listening. The same repre-
sentations are used during production (when speaking) and com-
prehension (when listening to another person). This explains why
linguistic repetition occurred in experiments such as Branigan
et al. (2000), who had participants take turns to describe and
match picture cards, and found that they tended to use the form of
utterance just used by their partner. For example, they tended to
use a “prepositional object” form such as the pirate giving the book
to the swimmer following another prepositional object sentence
but a “double object” form such as the pirate giving the swimmer
the book following another double object sentence (though both
sentences have essentially the same meaning). In such cases, the
same grammatical representation is activated during speaking
and listening. For a different form of evidence for syntactic parity,
see Kempen et al. (2011).
Second, the processes of alignment at different levels (e.g.,
words, structure, meaning) interact in such a way that increased
alignment at one level leads to increased alignment at other lev-
els (i.e., alignment percolates between levels). In this review,
we examine the neural evidence for these two assumptions. For
example, alignment of syntactic structure is enhanced by repe-
tition of words, with participants being even more likely to say
The cowboy handing the banana to the burglar after hearing The
chef handing the jug to the swimmer than after The chef giving
the jug to the swimmer (Branigan et al., 2000). Thus, alignment
at one level (in this case, lexical alignment) enhances alignment
at another level (in this case, grammatical alignment). Similarly,
people are more likely to use an unusual form such as the sheep
that’s red (rather than the red sheep) after they have just heard the
goat that’s red than after they heard the door that’s red (Cleland
and Pickering, 2003). This is because alignment at the seman-
tic level (in this case, with respect to animals) increases syntactic
alignment. Furthermore, alignment of words leads to alignment
of situation models—people who describe things the same way
tend to think about them in the same way too (Markman and
Makin, 1998). This means that alignment of low-level structure
can eventually affect alignment at the crucial level of speakers’
situation models, the hallmark of successful communication.
situation model situation model
semantic 
representation
semantic 
representation
syntactic 
representation
syntactic 
representation
lexical 
representation
lexical 
representation
phonological  
representation
phonological 
representation
phonetic 
representation
phonetic 
representation
message message
speaker A speaker B
FIGURE 1 | The interactive-alignment model (based on Pickering and Garrod, 2004). Speakers A and B represent two interlocutors in a dialogue in this
schematic representation of the stages of comprehension and production according to the model. The dashed lines represent alignment channels.
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In this review, we appraise the neural evidence for the interac-
tive alignment model. We focus on three central points. The first
is that parity of representations exists between speaking and lis-
tening. This is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for
interactive alignment between interlocutors to be possible. The
second is that alignment at one level of representation affects
alignment at another. We review what evidence is available, and
suggest concrete avenues for further research. The third is that
alignment of representations should be related to mutual under-
standing. Further, we briefly explore how alignment between
interlocutors may also play a role in controlling non-linguistic
aspects of a conversation.
NEURAL EVIDENCE
EVIDENCE FOR PARITY
If interactive alignment of different linguistic representations
between speakers and listeners is to be possible, then these rep-
resentations need to be coded in the same form irrespective of
whether a person is speaking or listening. There needs to be
parity of representations between language comprehension and
production. If this parity exists, then presumably, the neuronal
infrastructure underlying the processing of language at different
levels of representation should be the same during speaking and
listening. This is a prerequisite for neural alignment during con-
versation, in which both interlocutors speak and listen. Neural
parity underlies Hasson et al.’s (2012) brain-to-brain coupling
principle, in which parity emerges from the process by which the
perceiver’s perceptual system codes for an actor’s behavior.
Below, we review the evidence for parity of neural represen-
tations in speaking and listening across different linguistic levels.
We focus mainly on studies that have either directly compared the
two modalities, or manipulated one while observing the other.
The number of relevant studies is limited because neuroimaging
evidence on language production is much scarcer than on lan-
guage comprehension. Many of the studies, in particular those
concerned with higher-level processes, investigate whether differ-
ent modalities engage the same brain regions. This comparison
yields less-than-perfect evidence for parity, because it is possible
that the same brain region might code different representations,
but it does provide suggestive evidence.
Perception and production of speech sounds
Much of the debate on the neuronal overlap between action and
perception in language has focused on the role of the motor
system. In their motor theory of speech perception, Liberman
and Mattingly (1985) proposed that perceiving speech is to
perceive the articulatory gestures one would make to produce
the same speech. Thanks largely to the discovery of mirror
neurons (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998), this theory has received
renewed interest (Galantucci et al., 2006). It receives support
from TMS studies that have shown that listening to speech affects
the excitability of brain regions controlling articulatory muscles
(Watkins et al., 2003; Pulvermüller et al., 2006; Watkins and Paus,
2006). fMRI has provided converging evidence for enhanced
motor cortex activity when listening to speech compared to rest
(Wilson et al., 2004).
These studies show motor cortex involvement in perceiving
speech, but they do not make clear the exact role of the motor cor-
tex. According to motor theory, the primary motor cortex activity
should be specific to the sounds perceived. According to a pro-
posal by Scott et al. (2009), motor cortex involvement in speech
perception could instead reflect a process general to the act of per-
ceiving speech. In this proposal, the motor involvement reflects
a readiness on the part of the listener to take part in the con-
versation and hence commence speaking. However, TMS studies
suggest that the motor cortex activity during speech perception
is in fact specific to the sounds being articulated, as motor the-
ory would predict: the excitability of articulators through TMS
to the primary motor cortex is stronger when perceiving sounds
that require those articulators than when perceiving sounds that
require different articulators (Fadiga et al., 2002; D’Ausilio et al.,
2009). These claims are further supported by recent behavioral
evidence that the interference from distractor words on articula-
tion is greater when the distractors contain sounds incompatible
with the articulation target (Yuen et al., 2010).
In addition, primary motor cortex response to videos of words
being uttered depends on the articulatory complexity of these
words (Tremblay and Small, 2011). This suggests that the motor
involvement when listening to speech is related to the effort
required to produce the same speech, again suggesting that motor
cortex involvement in speech perception is specific to the con-
tent of the perceived speech. A different measure of articulatory
effort, sentence length, fails to support this observation: when
listening to sentences, primary motor cortex response does not
appear to depend on the length of sentences being heard (Menenti
et al., 2011; also see below). Hence, it is possible that the effect
of articulatory effort on motor involvement in speech perception
is specific to observing videos, or that it is somehow observ-
able when listening to single words but not when listening to
sentences. In this context, it is worth noting that many of the
studies showing motor involvement in perception use highly
artificial paradigms (e.g., presenting phonemes in isolation or
degrading the stimulus), and often compare speech to radically
different, often less complex, acoustic stimuli, so it is possible
that motor effects in natural speech perception could be less pro-
nounced (McGettigan et al., 2010). The null finding in a study
studying motor involvement in more naturalistic speech per-
ception (Menenti et al., 2011) could be an indication in this
direction.
Now that there is clear evidence for some motor involve-
ment in speech perception, the debate has shifted to whether
this involvement is a necessary component of perceiving speech.
Researchers from the mirror neuron tradition argue for a causal
role of the motor cortex involvement in speech perception
described above, much along the lines of motor theory of speech
perception (Pulvermüller and Fadiga, 2010). But an alternative
view proposes that motor activation can occur, but that it is not
necessary. The involvement has been characterized as modulatory
(Hickok, 2009; Lotto et al., 2009; but seeWilson, 2009) or as being
specific to certain situations and materials (Toni et al., 2008).
In any case, evidence showing a link between specific properties
of speech sounds being perceived and the articulators needed to
produce them suggest that there is a link between representations.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 185 | 3
Menenti et al. Neural basis of interactive alignment
In summary, there is considerable evidence for neural parity
at the level of speech sounds. In contrast, the evidence for neu-
ral parity at higher linguistic levels is much scarcer. In particular,
the technical difficulties associated with investigating speaking
in fMRI increase as the stimuli become longer (e.g., words, sen-
tences, narratives). Furthermore, psycholinguistics (unlike work
on the articulation and perception of speech) has generally
assumed that comprehension and production of language have
little to do with each other. We now review what is available on
lexical and syntactic processing in turn.
Parity of lexical processing
For processing of words, two similar studies contrasted process-
ing of intransitive (e.g., jump) and transitive (e.g., hit) verbs in
either speech production (DenOuden et al., 2009) or comprehen-
sion (Thompson et al., 2007). In the production study, the verbs
were elicited using pictures or videos, and in comprehension the
subjects read the verbs. The two studies produced very differ-
ent results for the two modalities: in the comprehension study
(Thompson et al., 2007), only one cluster in the left inferior pari-
etal lobe showed a significant difference between the two kinds of
verb. Despite the fact that a much larger distributed network of
areas showed the effect in production (Den Ouden et al., 2009),
that one cluster was not part of the production network.
However, studies that directly compare production with com-
prehension or manipulate the one while investigating the other
do find that words share neural processes between the twomodal-
ities. In an intra-operative mapping study, Ilmberger et al. (2001)
directly stimulated the cortex during comprehension and produc-
tion of words. The two tasks used had previously been shown
to share a lot of variance, which was taken to indicate that they
tapped into similar processes. Twelve out of 14 patients had sites
where stimulation affected both naming and comprehension per-
formance. Many of these sites were in left inferior frontal gyrus.
This region contains Brodmann area (BA) 44, which has been
shown to be involved both in lexical selection in speaking and
in lexical decision in listening (Heim et al., 2007, 2009). Menenti
et al. (2011) reported an fMRI adaptation study that compared
semantic, lexical, and syntactic processes in speaking and listen-
ing. They found that repetition of lexical content across heard or
spoken sentences induced suppression effects in the same set of
areas (left anterior and posterior middle temporal gyrus and left
inferior frontal gyrus) in both speaking and listening, although
the precuneus additionally showed an adaptation effect in speak-
ing but not listening. On the whole, then, there seems to be some
evidence that the linguistic processing of words is accomplished
by similar brain regions in speaking and listening.
Parity of syntax
There is somewhat clearer evidence for neural parity of syntax.
Such work builds on theoretical and behavioral studies that sup-
port parity of syntactic representations (Branigan et al., 2000).
Heim reviewed fMRI data on processing syntactic gender and
concluded that speaking and listening rely on the same network
of brain areas, in particular BA 44 (Heim, 2008). In addition,
Menenti et al.’s (2011) fMRI adaptation study showed that rep-
etition of syntactic structure (as found in active and passive tran-
sitive sentences) induced suppression effects in the same brain
regions (BA 44 and BA 21) for speaking and listening. However,
in a PET study on comprehension and production of syntac-
tic structure, Indefrey and colleagues found effects of syntactic
complexity in speech production (in BA 44), but not compre-
hension (Indefrey et al., 2004). They interpreted their data in
terms of theoretical accounts in which listeners need not always
fully encode syntactic structure but can instead rely on other
cues to understand what is being said (Ferreira et al., 2002), but
where speakers always construct complete syntactic representa-
tions. However, it is also possible that this lack of parity is due
to task requirements rather than indicating general differences
between production and comprehension.
Importantly, as mentioned above, studies showing that the
same brain regions are involved in two modalities do not prove
that the same representations or even the same processes are
being recruited. Conceivably, different neuronal populations in
the same general brain regions could process syntax in speak-
ing and listening respectively. To address this issue, Segaert et al.
(2011) used the same paradigm as Menenti et al. (2011), but this
time intermixing comprehension and production trials within
the same experiment. Participants therefore produced or heard
transitive sentences in interspersed order and the syntactic struc-
ture of these sentences could be either novel or repeated across
sentences. This produced cross-modal adaptation effects and no
interaction between the size of the effect and whether priming
was intra- or inter-modal. This strongly supports the idea that
the same neuronal populations are being recruited for the pro-
duction and comprehension of syntax in speaking and listening,
and hence that the neural representations involved in the two
modalities are alike.
So far we have reviewed evidence for parity of different types of
linguistic representations in speaking and listening, but in intra-
individual settings. While such parity is a necessary condition for
alignment, it is not a sufficient one: a central tenet of interactive
alignment is that representations become more aligned over the
course of dialogue. Testing this tenet requires studies in which
actual between-participant communication takes place, and in
which different levels of representation can be segregated in terms
of their neural signature. These studies, unfortunately, still need
to be done.
PERCOLATION
The interactive alignment account further predicts that alignment
at one level of representation leads to alignment at other levels
of representation as well. To test this prediction, it is necessary
to conduct studies in communicative settings that somehow tar-
get at least two levels of representation. In the introduction, we
have noted behavioral evidence from structural priming (Cleland
and Pickering, 2003). In another behavioral study, Adank et al.
(2010) showed that alignment of speech sounds can improve
comprehension. Participants were tested on their comprehension
of sentences in an unfamiliar accent presented in noise. They then
underwent one of several types of training: no training; just lis-
tening to the sentences; transcribing the sentences; repeating the
sentences in their own accent; repeating the sentences while imi-
tating the accent; and doing so in noise so that they could not hear
themselves speak. They were then tested on comprehension for
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a different set of similar sentences. Only the two imitation con-
ditions improved comprehension performance in the post-test.
This suggests that allowing a listener to align with the speaker
at the sound-based level that is required to produce the output
improves comprehension.
In a study investigating gestural communication, Schippers
and colleagues scanned pairs of players in a game of charades
(Schippers et al., 2010). They first scanned the gesturer and video-
taped his or her gestures, and then they scanned the guesser
while he or she was watching the videotape. Using Granger
Causality Mapping, they looked for brain regions whose activ-
ity in the gesturer predicted that in the guesser. First, they found
Granger-causation between the “putative mirror neuron system
(pMNS)”—defined as dorsal and ventral premotor, somatosen-
sory cortex, anterior inferior parietal lobule, and midtemporal
gyrus—from the gesturer to the guesser. This provides further
support for the extensive literature arguing for overlap in neu-
ral processes between action and perception (Hasson et al.,
2012). In addition, they found Granger-causation between the
gesturer’s pMNS and the guesser’s ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex, an area that is involved in inferring someone’s intention
(i.e., mentalizing; Amodio and Frith, 2006). Dale and colleagues
used the tangram task, a dialogue task known to elicit pro-
gressively more similar lexical representations from interlocu-
tors, to show that over time interlocutors’ eye movements also
become highly synchronous (Dale et al., 2011). Alignment in lex-
ical representation here, therefore, co-occurs with alignment in
behavior. Further, Broca’s area has often been found involved
in both producing and comprehending language at various lev-
els (Bookheimer, 2002; Hagoort, 2005), and in producing and
comprehending actions (Rossi et al., 2011), suggesting a poten-
tial neural substrate for percolation between these two levels
of representation. Together, these data suggest that alignment
between conversation partners occurs from lower to higher levels
of representation, and also between non-linguistic and linguistic
processes.
Admittedly, neural evidence for (or against) percolation is
scarce. As mentioned in the introduction, the lexical boost in syn-
tactic priming is one example of percolation. This lexical boost
could be used in an fMRI study by comparing syntactic prim-
ing between interlocutors in conditions with and without lexical
repetition. For example, if the study by Menenti et al. (2011)
was repeated in an interactive setting, then the extent of lexical
repetition suppression across participants should correlate with
syntactic priming. If inter-subject correlations in brain activity
reflect alignment (Stephens et al., 2010; see below), alignment at
one level (e.g., sound) could be manipulated, and the extent of
correlation between subjects as well as comprehension could be
assessed. Phonological alignment should affect the inter-subject
correlations, and in particular, it should affect those inter-subject
correlations that also correlate with the comprehension score of
the subject.
ULTIMATE GOAL OF COMMUNICATION: ALIGNMENT OF SITUATION
MODELS
According to the interactive alignment account, conversation is
successful to the extent that participants come to understand the
relevant aspects of what they are talking about in the same way.
Ultimately, therefore, alignment of situation models is crucial—
both to communication and to the interactive alignment account.
In an fMRI study, Awad et al. (2007) showed that a similar
network of areas is involved in comprehending and producing
narrative speech. However, production and comprehension were
each contrasted with radically different baseline conditions before
being compared to one another, making the results hard to inter-
pret. In their fMRI adaptation study on overlap between speaking
and listening, Menenti et al. (2011) also looked at repetition of
sentence-level meaning. As for lexical repetition and syntactic
repetition, they found that the same brain regions (in this case,
the bilateral temporoparietal junction) show adaptation effects
irrespective of whether people are speaking or listening, sug-
gesting a neuronal correlate for parity of meaning. This study,
however, left unanswered the question at which level of mean-
ing parity of representations held: was it the non-verbal situation
model underlying the sentences, or the linguistic meaning of the
sentences itself?
In a follow-up study on sentence production, Menenti et al.
(2012) thus further distinguished between repetition of the lin-
guistic meaning of sentences (the sense) or the underlying mental
representation (the reference). For example, if the sentence The
man kisses the woman was used twice to refer to different subse-
quent pictures, this constituted a repetition of sense. Conversely,
the same picture of a man kissing a woman could be shown first
with the sentence The red man kisses the green woman and then
with the sentence The yellow man kisses the blue woman, leading
to a repetition of reference. The brain regions previously shown
to have similar semantic repetition effects in speaking and lis-
tening (Menenti et al., 2011) turned out to be mainly sensitive
to repetition of referential meaning: they showed suppression
effects when the same picture was repeated even if with a different
sentence, but did not exhibit any such sensitivity to the repeti-
tion of sentences themselves if accompanied by different pictures.
This suggests alignment of underlying non-linguistic representa-
tions in speaking and listening, rather than purely alignment of
linguistic semantic structure.
It is also possible to investigate alignment ofmeaning in amore
naturalistic way, while still allowing for a detailed analysis. The
drawback of naturalistic experiments is often that interpretations
are hard to draw because the relevant details of the stimulus are
not clear. This problem can be circumvented by using subjects
as models for each other, an inter-subject correlation approach
(Hasson et al., 2004). The idea is that if there are areas where
subjects’ brain activity is the same over the whole time-course
of a stimulus, these correlations in brain activity are likely to be
driven by that stimulus, whatever the stimulus may be. Stephens
et al. (2010) used this approach to investigate inter-subject corre-
lations in fMRI between a speaker and a group of listeners. They
first recorded a speaker in the scanner while she was telling an
unrehearsed story, and then recorded listeners who heard that
story. Correlations between speakers and listeners occurred in
many different brain regions. These correlations were positively
related to listeners’ comprehension (as measured by a subse-
quent test). When a group of listeners were presented a story in
an unfamiliar language (Russian), these correlations disappeared.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 185 | 5
Menenti et al. Neural basis of interactive alignment
This suggests that alignment in brain activity between a speaker
communicating information and a listener hearing it is tied to the
understanding of that information.
In a study on listeners only, Lerner et al. (2011) studied inter-
subject correlations for four levels of temporal structure: reversed
speech, a word list, a list of paragraphs, and a story. They found
that as the temporal structure of the materials increased (i.e., they
were closer to complete stories), the correlations between partic-
ipants extended from auditory cortex further posterior and into
the parietal lobes. This study was conducted with listeners only,
and thus did not properly target alignment between interlocutors
in communication. However it provides indirect evidence: the
interactive alignment account assumes that listeners align with
speakers. Different listeners of the same speaker should, therefore,
also align. Building on the speaker-listener correlations shown
by Stephens et al. (2010) listener-listener correlations can, then,
tell us something about neural alignment. These findings provide
some evidence that alignment at several levels of representation
leads to more extensive correlations in brain activity. However,
for both Stephens et al. (2010) and Lerner et al. (2011) a word
of caution is in order: both studies showed an effect (in this case,
a correlation) in one condition but not the other (in Stephens
et al., different languages; in Lerner et al. different temporal struc-
tures); they did not show that the conditions were significantly
different.
These studies provide evidence that situation models for even
very complex stimuli can be usefully investigated by using novel
analysis techniques. They suggest that alignment can be tracked
in the brain, and can be measured in time as well (Hasson
et al., 2012). More work is needed though: while these studies
suggest that alignment can be operationalized as inter-subject
correlations, and that these are related to understanding, differ-
ent levels of representations can only be distinguished indirectly,
by mapping the findings onto other studies that haven’t neces-
sarily targeted communication. An important avenue for further
research, therefore, is to investigate in more detail to what aspects
of communication correlations in different brain regions are due.
Furthermore, the interactive alignment account assumes that dia-
logue is not just an expanded monologue. Therefore, if we want
to find out how dialogue works, we will need to go and study
dialogue.
NON-LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF DIALOGUE
The interactive-alignment model assumes that successful com-
munication is supported by interlocutors aligning at many dif-
ferent levels of representation. Above, we have reviewed studies
concerned with linguistic representations. But language alone is
not sufficient to have a proper conversation (Enrici et al., 2010;
Willems and Varley, 2010). Alignment between interlocutors may
also be occurring for additional non-linguistic processes that are
necessary to keep a conversation flowing. In Section “Ultimate
Goal of Communication: Alignment of Situation Models” we
discussed a few examples of where alignment of non-linguistic
processes may percolate into alignment of linguistic represen-
tations. Below, we touch upon proposals of how alignment of
non-linguistic processes may help govern the act of holding a
conversation.
During conversation, we do not only use language to con-
vey our intentions. Body posture, prosody, and gesture are vital
aspects of conversation and are taken into account effortlessly
when trying to infer what a speaker intends. Abundant evidence
suggests that gesture and speech comprehension and produc-
tion are closely related (Willems and Hagoort, 2007; Enrici et al.,
2012). Percolation between gesture and speech could, there-
fore, occur just like percolation within levels of representation
in speech. The extensive literature on the mirror neuron sys-
tem shows that action observation and action execution are
intimately intertwined (Fabbri-Destro and Rizzolatti, 2008), sug-
gesting a plausible neural correlate for alignment at the gestural
level between interlocutors. Communicative gestures have indeed
been shown to produce related brain activity in observers’ and
gesturers’ pMNSs (Schippers et al., 2010).
Once a person has settled on a message, they may need to
decide how best to convey it in a particular setting to a particular
partner. A set of studies targeted the generation or recogni-
tion of such communicative intentions in verbal and non-verbal
communication. Both tasks were designed to make communi-
cation difficult and hence enhance the need for such processes:
in the non-verbal experiment, participants devised a novel form
of communication using only the movement of shapes in a grid
(Noordzij et al., 2009). In the verbal experiment, participants
described words to each other, but were not allowed to use words
highly associated with the target (Willems et al., 2010). Both stud-
ies showed that sending and receiving these messages involved the
same brain region: the right temporo-parietal junction in non-
verbal communication, and the left temporo-parietal junction in
verbal communication. These studies support parity for com-
municative processes in verbal and non-verbal communication,
respectively. However in neither study was feedback allowed, so
they would need to be generalized to interactive dialogue.
Another important aspect of holding a smooth conversation
is turn taking. While we may well be attuned to what our part-
ner intends to say, if we fail to track when it is our turn to
speak and when it is not, then we are likely to pause exces-
sively between contributions, speak at the same time, or inter-
rupt each other, leaving the conversation with little chance of
success. One account has alignment of neural oscillations play-
ing a major role in conversation (Wilson and Wilson, 2005).
In this account, the production system of a speaker oscillates
with a syllabic phase: the readiness to initiate a new syllable
is at a minimum in the middle of a syllable and peaks half a
cycle after syllable offset. Conversation partners’ oscillation rates
become entrained over the course of a conversation, but they
are in anti-phase, so that the speaker’s readiness to speak is at
minimum when the listener’s is at a maximum, and vice versa
(Gambi and Pickering, 2011; Hasson et al., 2012). A further
hypothesis is that the theta frequency range is central to this
mechanism: across languages, typical speech production is 3–8
syllables per second (Drullman, 1995; Greenberg et al., 2003;
Chandrasekaran et al., 2009). Auditory cortex has been shown
to produce ongoing oscillations at this frequency (Buzsaki and
Draguhn, 2004). A possibility is that the ongoing oscillations res-
onate with the incoming speech at the same frequency, thereby
amplifying the signal. This means that the neural oscillations
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in the theta frequency band become entrained between listeners
and speakers, and that this aids communication (Hasson et al.,
2012).
Entrainment at the syllable frequency, however, cannot be
enough to explain turn-taking as we don’t normally want to
interrupt our interlocutors at every syllable (Gambi and Pickering,
2011). Recently, Bourguignon et al. (2012) demonstrated coher-
ence between a speakers’ speech production (f0 formant) and lis-
tener’s brain oscillations around 0.5Hz. This frequency is related
to the prosodic envelope of speech. Indeed, the coherence was also
present for unintelligible speech stimuli (a foreign language or
a hummed text), but in different brain regions. Possibly, then,
resonating with our interlocutor’s speech patterns at different
frequencies enables us to better predict when his turn will end
(Giraud and Poeppel, 2012).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In the above, we have reviewed neural evidence relevant to the
interactive alignment model of conversation. While neuroimag-
ing studies on speech production of anything more complex than
a single phoneme are still too scarce to provide a definite answer,
the evidence is mounting that speakers and listeners generally
employ the same brain regions for the same types of stimuli.
Indeed, when communicating, speakers’ and listeners also show
correlated brain activity. Alignment is, therefore, both possible
and real.
But does neural alignment occur during interactive language?
It would surely be surprising if neural alignment occurred when
speakers and listeners were separated, but did not occur when
they interacted (in part because psycholinguistic evidence for
alignment is based on dialogue; Pickering and Garrod, 2004).
However, the current literature does not yet directly answer this
question. The field needs strategies to meaningfully study inter-
acting participants. Promising approaches have been devised for
non-linguistic live interaction (Newman-Norlund et al., 2007,
2008; Dumas et al., 2010, 2011; Redcay et al., 2010; Baess et al.,
2012; Guionnet et al., 2012). It is time that neuroimaging research
on language follows suit—not an easy challenge, as the dearth
of studies attempting this shows. Technical challenges aren’t the
only issue when wanting to study conversation: with so little
control over a stimulus; it is hard to devise experiments that pro-
vide precise and meaningful information. Gambi and Pickering
(2011) provide suggestions for possible paradigms to study inter-
active language use; these may also be beneficial to neuroimaging
research on the topic.
As the attention of neuroscience turns toward the role of pre-
diction (Friston and Kiebel, 2009; Friston, 2010; Clark, in press),
interactive alignment provides a natural mechanistic basis on
which predictions can be built. Pickering and Garrod (in press)
propose a “simulation” account in which comprehenders covertly
imitate speakers and use those representations to predict upcom-
ing utterances (and therefore prepare their own contributions
accordingly). Comprehenders are more likely to predict appropri-
ately when they are well-aligned with speakers; but in addition,
the process of covert imitation provides a mechanism for align-
ment. This account assumes that production processes are used
during comprehension (and in fact that comprehension processes
are used during production).
Based on the interactive alignment model, wemake the follow-
ing predictions for further research on dialogue: (1) Alignment:
speaking and listening make use of similar representations,
and hence have largely overlapping neural correlates. We have
reviewed the available evidence for this prediction above, but
more work is needed, particularly studies targeting both speaking
and listening simultaneously: the overlap in neuronal corre-
lates for each level of representation should further be increased
in an interactive, communicative setting compared to non-
communicative settings. (2) Percolation: alignment at one level
of representation leads to alignment at other levels. In partic-
ular, alignment at lower levels of representation leads to better
alignment of situation models, and thus, better communica-
tion. We have reviewed the (scarce) evidence available above,
but truly putting this prediction to the test requires that studies
of interacting interlocutors manipulate different levels of rep-
resentation simultaneously, and furthermore have an outcome
measure of communicative success. (3) Language processes are
complemented by processes specific to a communicative set-
ting. By carefully targeting both linguistic and non-linguistic
aspects of conversation, future research will hopefully be able to
demonstrate how these processes interact.
CONCLUSION
We have reviewed neural evidence for the interactive alignment
model of conversation. For linguistic processes, we have shown
that representations in speaking and listening are similar, and
that, hence, alignment between participants in a conversation is
at least possible. We have further reviewed evidence pertaining
to the goal of a conversation, which is to communicate. As the
interactive alignment model predicts, the ease of constructing a
situation model is associated with increased correlation in brain
activity between participants. Finally, we have touched upon liter-
ature dealing with alignment of processes more specific to the act
of communicating, and suggested how these might relate to the
interactive-alignment model.
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